In Matter of Peasley, 208 Ariz. 27, 90 P.3d 764 (2004). Prosecutor disbarred for intentionally presenting perjured testimony through police detective to establish critical fact in two separate capital murder trials. Substantial experience, dishonest motive and repeated misconduct were all aggravating factors.

In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. 232, 92 P.3d 862 (2004). Prosecuting attorney suspended for improper cross-examination of defendant’s expert in mental defense case. Prosecutor also committed violation in closing argument by attempting to cause jury to convict based on fear of future crimes by defendant. Lengthy experience as prosecutor found to be aggravating factor because prosecutor knew actions were improper and violations were intentional.

In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43 (Colo. 2003). Attorney disciplined for walking out of courtroom during course of trial. Court had specifically ordered attorney to stay in courtroom.

People v. Janiszewski, 901 P.2d 476 (Colo. 1995). Attorney disciplined for asking questions in jury trial which specifically called for information ruled to be inadmissible in pretrial hearing. Attorney also mentioned that evidence in closing argument.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Armengau, 99 Ohio St. 3d 55, 788 N.E.2d 1068 (2003). Criminal defense attorney publicly reprimanded for conducting cross examination of State’s witness in one case using his own personal experiences and asking questions which had no basis in fact and, in second case, asking questions disallowed by trial court’s ruling regarding scope of examination of informant.

Dowling v. Alabama State Bar, 539 So.2d 149 (Ala. 1988). Attorney cannot use campaign materials that are misleading. “Judge Brian Dowling for District Judge” implied that candidate was judge when was not.

In Re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003). Former prosecutor/judicial candidate’s platform stressing allegiance to police officers and pledging to help police by putting criminals where they belong (“behind bars”) and to “bend over backwards” to protect victims violated canon of ethics prohibiting candidate from making statements that commits candidate with respect to cases likely to come before court.

In re Lidov, 129 Ill. 2d 424, 544 N.E.2d 294 (1989). Attorney suspended for making personal loan to judge seeking election to Supreme Court when attorney had case pending before judge and loan made in cash to judge rather than campaign committee.

In re Lane, 127 Ill. 2d 90, 535 N.E.2d 866 (1982). Attorney suspended for one year for personally loaning judge $2,500 to assist judge in paying campaign expenses, rather than giving money to campaign fund.

In matter of McNally, 901 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1995). Attorney disciplined for failure to appear on calendar call for two separate criminal cases.

In Matter of Conduct of McNabb, 395 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1964). Attorney disciplined for failure to appear at pretrial conferences in five different cases.

Matter of Offenhartz, 173 Ariz. 382, 843 P.2d 1274 (1992). Defense counsel suspended for ineffective representation, i.e., representation that was so deficient that was likely different result would have been obtained by competent counsel.

People v. Smith, 74 P.3d 566 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2003). Attorney disciplined for failure to adequately supervise non-lawyer staff person who neglected client’s matter.

People v. Bonner, 927 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1996). Defense counsel in criminal case disciplined for not reviewing police reports, preliminary hearing transcript or anything else after being retained by defendant. When court became aware of same, it informed defendant and allowed him to hire new counsel. Complaint with disciplinary authority was filed.

In re Guy, 756 A.2d 875 (Del. Supr. 2000). Defense attorney disciplined for failure to interview known potential defense witnesses, failure to properly inform defendant of possible consequences of rejection of plea offer, failure to attend first scheduled sentencing appearance, and failure to file appeal in timely manner.

Matter of Atkins, 253 Ga. 319, 320 S.E.2d 146 (1984). Defense counsel in capital murder case disbarred for failure to familiarize himself with even most basic trial procedures. Counsel was unaware before commencement of trial that there were two phases to capital case, presented no mitigation witnesses, and made closing argument in punishment phase that consisted of four sentences.

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Breiner, 89 Haw. 167, 969 P.2d 1285 (1999). Six month suspension warranted due to attorney’s behavior in single trial (consisting of argument during opening statements, argumentative and disrespectful cross-examination, and improper comments in presence of jury on two occasions) which resulted in attorney being convicted of four counts of criminal contempt of court by trial judge, prolonged trial itself, and required prosecution and defendant’s subsequent counsel to expend considerable time on appeal addressing effect of attorney behavior before trial court.

Matter of Price, 238 Kan. 426, 709 P.2d 986 (1985). County Attorney disciplined for repeated failure to abide by discovery orders issued by court and repeated misrepresentations to judge and defense counsel. In second matter, Respondent failed to represent State’s interest as appellee in appeal from conviction of forgery due to his failure to file brief and, on day before oral argument was scheduled in Court of Appeals, calling defense counsel and offering to confess error, resulting in reversal and order for new trial.

State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Holscher, 193 Neb. 729, 230 N.W.2d 75 (1975). County Attorney disciplined for prematurely filing claims for services rendered in connection with foreclosing tax sale certificates and for failing to familiarize himself with law and procedures concerning foreclosing tax sale certificates.

In re Colton Fontan, 28 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1 (Feb 21, 1991). Group of prosecutors received varying degrees of discipline for reckless and gross negligence in investigation of killing by police officers of two criminals who had participated in various acts of terrorism.

Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Turgeon, 210 W.Va. 181, 557 S.E.2d 235 (2000). Attorney disciplined for incompetent representation of client in murder case and in separate narcotics prosecution.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dumke, 248 Wis. 2d 704, 635 N.W.2d 594 (2001). Attorney disciplined for failure to provide competent representation in sexually violent predator proceeding.

Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lindberg, 173 Wis. 2d 588, 494 N.W.2d 421 (1993). Prosecutor disciplined for failure to file journal entries in numerous cases and for failure to make good faith effort to locate victim of crime for preliminary hearing.

In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43 (Colo. 2003). Attorney disciplined for walking out of courtroom during course of trial. Court had specifically ordered attorney to stay in courtroom.

Matter of Ramunno, 625 A.2d 248 (Del. 1993). Attorney disciplined for referring to opposing counsel in “crude, but graphic, anal term” heard only by court. Court found attorney in contempt and fined him $150.00. Attorney appeared in same court following day and asked court to recuse itself, arguing that judge might be mad at him from previous day. When court assured counsel that he did not get mad, counsel responded with, “You get even. Is that what you are saying?” Court again found counsel in contempt and fined him again. Ethics complaint followed, and Supreme Court held that Ramunno’s conduct constituted unprofessional conduct warranting public censure

Matter of Belue, 232 Mont. 365, 766 P.2d 206 (1988). Attorney physically assaulted another attorney while prosecuting case, attempted to use information he obtained in his position as county attorney to institute civil suit, and represented clients in actions against county while holding position of county attorney. Supreme Court held that actions constituted ethical violations warranting three-month suspension and public censure

Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 84 Ohio St. 3d 346, 704 N.E.2d 246 (1999). Attorney disciplined for yelling obscenity at opposing party and racial slur at opposing party’s counsel.

Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court, 771 S.W.2d 116 (Tenn. 1989). Prosecutor disciplined for leaving courtroom and slamming door while judge was addressing jury and for willful failure to answer direct questions from judge.

In re Miller, 677 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. 1997). Prosecutor publicly reprimanded for unlawfully using prosecutorial authority to assist private litigant to collect civil judgment and failing to comply with discovery orders.

Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 2004). Attorney disciplined for working part-time as public defender while working full-time state job and using sick leave from full-time job to make court appearances for public defender. Also submitted false expense reports to public defender.

Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marcum, 830 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1992). Prosecutors publicly reprimanded for accepting private employment in matters they had involvement in as public employees.

Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Lovelace, 778 S.W.2d 651, 653-654 (Ky. 1989). Attorney suspended for accepting private employment in matter in which had responsibility to prosecute and attempting to use promise of probation in criminal case as leverage to obtain personal contribution from defendant in civil case. Court also took opportunity to address propriety of prosecutor’s engagement in private practice. “By statute, county attorneys and a majority of Commonwealth Attorneys are entitled to maintain a private civil practice. While some may believe such is unwise or contrary to the best interest of the Commonwealth, nothing in our law or Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits such practice. It is obvious, however, that this creates a great potential for conflict of interest as many criminal acts are subject also to redress in civil actions. This is particularly true in rural areas which are served by a small number of lawyers engaged in the practice of law and in which the public prosecutor is often one of the more prominent local practitioners. When an attorney declares his intention to seek elective office as a Commonwealth Attorney or a county attorney, it should be with the certain knowledge that his civil practice will be severely restricted upon assuming the office and that the public office he holds will take precedence over his private practice. A prosecutor must decline employment in any civil action when there is any reasonable probability that a criminal prosecution might arise from the circumstances of the case. If, after accepting employment in a civil matter, a criminal prosecution arises from the circumstances of the case the prosecuting attorney must withdraw from the civil proceeding and disqualify himself from handling the prosecution. While the views expressed above do not represent a change in the law, we note that in the past such rules have frequently been observed with a great degree of flexibility. In the future, however, violations of the rules reiterated herein will not be tolerated.”

In re Toups, 773 So. 2d 709 (La. 2000). Prosecutor disciplined for not withdrawing from representation of woman in divorce case when she filed criminal charges against her husband. Prosecutor’s conduct also included failure to report misconduct of another ADA who attempted to have husband’s case continued indefinitely while representing both husband and State.

In re Discipline of Attorney, 422 Mass. 660, 815 N.E.2d 1072 (2004). Attorney disciplined for giving advice to unrepresented victim of domestic violence case while representing perpetrator of violence. Even though both parties wanted matter dismissed, court found attorney’s conduct to be unethical.

Sanders v. Mississippi State Bar Assn., 466 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 1985). Prosecuting attorney may not accept employment in civil matter which involves issues and parties that would likely become subject of criminal proceedings in which he will have responsibility. Public reprimand issued.

Matter of Belue, 232 Mont. 365, 766 P.2d 206 (1988). Attorney physically assaulted another attorney while prosecuting case, attempted to use information obtained in position as county attorney to institute civil suit, and represented clients in actions against county while holding position of county attorney. Three month suspension and public censure issued.

In re Truder, 37 N.M. 69, 17 P.2d 951 (N.M. 1932). District Attorney disciplined for representing State in criminal prosecution and victim of crime in civil case against same defendant arising out of same incident at same time.

Matter of McDonald, 174 A.D.2d 942, 571 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1991). District attorney censured for representing estates in contravention of law stating full time district attorney could not otherwise practice law.

In re Conduct of Lawrence, 337 Or, 450, 98 P.3d 366 (2004). Defense attorney disciplined for advising victim of domestic violence when he represented perpetrator of violence at same time.

In re Complaint of Snyder, 276 Or. 897, 559 P.2d 1273 (1976). Attorney disciplined for continuing to work and receive fees as private attorney after becoming District Attorney.

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 546 Pa. 628, 687 A.2d 1118 (1997). Defense counsel disbarred for using person to impersonate one client, have impersonator confess to crime, plead guilty and be sentenced so that he could use that information to obtain dismissal against second client charged in same incident.

In Matter of Mike S. Jolly, 269 S.C. 668, 239 S.E.2d 490 (1977). Prosecuting attorney disciplined for accepting fees in civil case arising out of reckless homicide case he was prosecuting.

In re Bartlett, 47 S.D. 208, 197 N.W. 285 (1924). State’s Attorney publicly reprimanded for using influence of his office to coerce settlement in civil cases.

In re Wilmarth, 42 S.D. 76, 172 N.W. 921 (1919). State’s Attorney disciplined for involvement in both criminal and civil cases arising out of common nucleus of facts.

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Michels, 150 Wash. 2d 159, 75 P.3d 950 (2003). Attorney who served as part-time judge in one jurisdiction and part-time public defender in another disciplined for presiding over cases of clients he represented as public defender.

Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Farber, 200 W. Va. 185, 488 S.E.2d 460 (1997). Attorney disciplined for revealing confidential information of client in motion to withdraw and for threatening same client.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kremkoski, 277 Wis. 2d 83, 690 N.W.2d 430 (2004). Attorney disciplined for obtaining DV protective order for one client and representing another charged with violating same order.

In re Ockrassa, 165 Ariz. 576, 799 P.2d 1350 (1990). Prosecutor suspended for representing State in case against former client. New charge was felony DUI which required proof of previous DUI convictions, and prosecutor had represented defendant on previous DUIs. Defendant denied previous convictions. Defendant’s new counsel had suggested that prosecutor withdraw, and prosecutor had refused.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas, 91 Ohio St. 3d 86, 742 N.E.2d 612 (2001). Attorney disciplined for forwarding information that drug raid was about to be conducted to former client. There is no indication how attorney got information.

In re Jett, 180 Ariz. 103, 882 P.2d 414 (1994). Judicial misconduct committed when municipal court judge called and had her abusive boyfriend arrested and then, acting in her judicial capacity, went to detention facility and signed order for his release.

People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass’n v. ____, Attorney at Law, 90 Colo. 440, 442-443, 9 P.2d 611 (Colo. 1932). Part-time Deputy District Attorney disciplined for submitting claim for reimbursement of secretary’s full salary when he only paid half salary, rest being paid by person with whom he shared office space. Court also found the district attorney’s filing of civil suits arising out of same facts for which he was prosecuting defendant criminally to constitute misconduct. “This anomalous conduct could not be made to square with professional ethics by his later withdrawal from the criminal cases. The merest novice in the profession should know that civil liabilities may not be enforced by threats of criminal prosecution any more than they may be enforced by threats of physical violence, and that any conduct which has the appearance of a resort to such course is as bad, in law, as the thing itself. If B did not use his public office to collect the claims of his private clients, he put himself in the position of appearing to do so and justified the charge. If a prosecutor in this state has a private interest in a criminal case under his jurisdiction, it is made the court's duty to appoint another to act for him. In such a case he should not act even by consent.”

People v. Anglim, 33 Colo. 40, 78 P. 687 (1904). District Attorney disbarred for accepting money from saloon keepers and gamblers in return for not prosecuting them, as well as demanding money from victim in theft case to commence prosecution.

In re Sims 861 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2004). Attorney for driver’s license administrative board disbarred for fixing tickets for family members and friends. Conviction for misdemeanor arising out of said conduct involved moral turpitude.

In re Petition for Review, 140 Idaho 800, 102 P.3d 1119 (2004). Prosecutor disciplined for obtaining grand jury transcript without order of court in case he was prosecuting and giving copy of that transcript to third party engaged in civil litigation against same defendant.

In re Lane, 127 Ill. 2d 90, 535 N.E.2d 866 (1982). Attorney suspended for one year for personally loaning judge $2,500 to assist judge in paying campaign expenses, rather than giving money to campaign fund.

In re Disciplinary Action Against Fridell, 557 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1997). Attorney holding public office disciplined for having sexual relationship with adult employee of that office; discipline, which was stipulated to by attorney, consisted of public reprimand, resignation of public office and payment of costs related to disciplinary proceeding.

In re Disciplinary Action Against Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1988). Chief Deputy City Attorney disciplined for dismissing or delaying traffic ticket brought to him by people to whom he was indebted; fact that would have done same thing for people not indebted to him found not to be mitigating factor.

State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Rhodes, 234 Neb. 799, 453 N.W.2d 73, 89-90 (1990). County Attorney disciplined for developing and fostering relationship with person who was defendant in criminal case as well as subject of several ongoing felony investigations. Quoting from another opinion, the Court reviewed the rationale for disqualification of prosecutors: “Courts around the country recognize two policy considerations underlying the disqualification of prosecuting attorneys for a conflict of interest. The first policy served by the rule is fairness to the accused. It is universally recognized that a prosecutor's duty is to obtain justice, not merely to convict.... The second policy served by disqualification of a prosecuting attorney for conflict of interest is the preservation of public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice system. American courts have consistently held that the appearance of impropriety is sufficient to justify disqualification of a prosecuting attorney.” (citations omitted.)

In re Ross, 276 A.D.2d 91, 716 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 2000). Prosecutor and her attorney husband were both censured when, at husband’s request, prosecutor tried to use position to undermine traffic summons issued to husband.

In re Madden, 260 A.D. 932, 24 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1940). District Attorney disbarred for accepting bribes from defense counsel to “go easy” on doctors who were performing illegal abortions.

Matter of McNerthney, 95 Wash. 2d 38, 621 P.2d 731 (1980). Prosecutor learned search warrant being issued to look for drugs at house of acquaintance who prosecutor had previously talked to in attempt to persuade him to stop dealing drugs; prosecutor went out drinking with office associates, became intoxicated and went to aquaintance’s house to yell at him, during which he gave him notice of search warrant. Prosecutor found to have revealed a confidence of his client, the State, in violation of disciplinary rules and letter of admonition issued.

Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Donovan, 211 Wis. 2d 451, 564 N.W.2d 772 (1997). Assistant City prosecutor disciplined for forging certificate of completion of diversion program for friend and for dismissing traffic ticket for boyfriend.

Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Penn, 201 Wis. 2d 405, 548 N.W.2d 526 (1996). County attorney suspended for prosecution of persons with whom he had personally used illegal drugs thereby creating conflict of interest.

In re Kenton County Bar Assn., 314 Ky. 664, 236 S.W.2d 906 (1951). It is improper for partner of assistant prosecutor to defend criminal case in same judicial circuit.

Bert P. Noojin v. Alabama State Bar, 577 So. 2d 420 (Ala. 1990). Attorney’s disciplinary suspension from practice of law due to misdemeanor contempt conviction overturned and case remanded to Disciplinary Board for further consideration due to circumstances surrounding disciplinary process, including improper delay in proceedings and one-year suspension as part of sentence on misdemeanor conviction.

In re Schuler, 818 P.2d 138, 141 (Alaska 1991). District Attorney’s conviction for misdemeanor theft warranted two years' suspension, in light of mitigating circumstances. In rendering its decision, the Court discussed the injury caused by the prosecutor’s actions: “…the duty here was one owed to the public. In light of Schuler's position as District Attorney, his commission of a crime undoubtedly undermined confidence in the legal profession. The public most certainly expects obedience to the law by those with authority to prosecute others for its violation. It undermines the foundations of our criminal justice system to uncover a public servant violating the very statutes he is entrusted with enforcing. By committing a crime, Schuler violated his oath of office as District Attorney for the State of Alaska, and weakened the moral authority of the state to condemn other violations of the criminal law. We therefore conclude that Schuler's misdemeanor theft caused "serious" injury under the relevant ABA Standards.”

People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680, 681 (Colo. 1983). District Attorney billed two counties in his district for same expenses related to attendance of convention in company of female informer. During his criminal trial for related theft, he testified on cross-examination that not know the whereabouts of female companion when, in fact, he had purchased airline ticket for her month earlier to travel out-of-state under assumed name. Finding that Tucker’s “conduct while in office not only contravened Colorado criminal statutes, but also flagrantly violated minimal standards of candor and honesty required of all who are admitted to the practice of law in this jurisdiction”, Court suspended him from practice of law.

In re Feindt, 301 A.D.2d 185, 754 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept. 2002). Prosecutor stole witness fee, was fired and criminally prosecuted. Following entry into diversion agreement, disciplinary proceedings instituted and former prosecutor admitted violating disciplinary rules prohibiting illegal conduct adversely reflecting on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as lawyer; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and conduct adversely reflecting on fitness as lawyer. Court found censure appropriate punishment because attorney had been suffering from depression for which being treated, restitution had been made, attorney demonstrated extreme remorse and community service work had been performed.

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Page, 754 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1988). Attorney resigned from bar after being convicted of racketeering activities as district attorney.

People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986). District Attorney disbarred after he was convicted of altering official documents. He prevailed upon employee of driver control bureau to alter his driving record by deleting two convictions for speeding because they were resulting in higher insurance premiums.

Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 925 P.2d 1118 (1996). Court held that no actual harm need be proved for rule violation to have occurred, and that – because rules are designed to prevent harm, not just to sanction attorneys after harm has been done – lawyer can be disciplined whether or not conduct caused actual harm to another.

Grievance Committee for the Southern District of New York v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995). Committee on Grievances for Southern District of New York imposed sanction of censure upon Simels for violating Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility (predecessor of current Rule 4.2, MRPC) by contacting individual, whom Simels knew (1) to be represented by counsel on charge he participated in attempted murder of government witness in drug conspiracy trial in which Simels' client was defendant, (2) had agreed to cooperate with government, and (3) had implicated Simels' client in the shooting. Prior to Simels' contact with individual, prosecution had informed Simels and his client that it would be filing complaint against individual and two other codefendants in connection with attempted murder of government witness (so that soon Simels’ client and individual would be facing similar charges in same case). Court of Appeals, disagreeing with Committee’s interpretation of Rule 7-104(A)(1), found that Simels, in interviewing individual, was not interviewing “party” in “same matter,” but rather interviewing potential witness in drug conspiracy case and potential codefendant of his client in related but distinct matter, i.e., attempted murder of witness. Censure was lifted. Court also, noting that requiring federal courts to follow various and often conflicting state court and bar association interpretations of disciplinary rules threatened to “balkanize” federal law, held that interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1), in federal criminal context was matter of federal law.

Ex parte Lawhorn, 581 So.2d 1179 (Ala. 1991). New Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to prosecutors.

Brooks v. Alabama State Bar, 574 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1990). Because prosecutor had reason to believe conduct not governed by Code of Professional Responsibility, based on language in prior Supreme Court opinions dealing with rules governing conduct of attorneys, due process prohibited imposition of discipline on prosecutor under Code.

Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 663 A.2d 317 (1995). Case arose from allegations that prosecutor had talked to complaining witness in unauthorized absence of her attorney in violation of Rule 4.2, had prosecuted case in absence of probable cause as required by Rule 3.8, had violated Rules 3.4 and 3.5 by requesting psychiatric assessment of child witnesses, and Rule 4.4 by improper cross-examination of defense witness. Proceedings stayed until prosecutor’s assertion that separated of powers doctrine prohibited judicial branch from disciplining prosecutors. Court, thoroughly analyzing the issues involved, held judicial supervision of attorneys through disciplinary process does not violate separation of powers doctrine when applied to prosecutors. [Outcome of disciplinary proceeding not known.]

Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 925 P.2d 1118 (1996). Court held that no actual harm need be proved for rule violation to have occurred, and that – because rules are designed to prevent harm, not just to sanction attorneys after harm has been done – lawyer can be disciplined whether or not conduct caused actual harm to another.

Matter of Howes, 123 N.M. 311, 940 P.2d 159 (1997). Assistant United States Attorney disciplined for communicating with represented defendant concerning incident with which defendant was charged. Defendant initiated calls while Assistant United States Attorney, relying upon advice provided by his supervisor, listened, took notes and told defendant that his lawyer would not be happy about call. Finding there was no "arguable question of professional duty’ needing resolution,” Court first rejected contention that attorney could not be disciplined because was subordinate attorney and following guidance of supervisor attorneys; in doing so, Court analyzed Rule 5.2. Court also held that attorney “communicates” with person, for purposes of ethics rules, even if just listens to other person talk. Court distinguished between constitutional and ethical rules on contact with represented persons.

In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 2002). Prosecutor alleged to have violated Rule 3.8(d) by failing to turn over evidence to defense prior to preliminary hearing. As a matter of first impression, Court addressed whether 3.8(d) incorporates a materiality standard. “We have explicitly adopted a materiality standard with respect to our procedural [discovery] rules, and we are disinclined to impose inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors. We therefore also adopt a materiality standard as to the latter, such that we read Rule 3.8(d) as containing a requirement that a prosecutor disclose exculpatory, outcome-determinative evidence that tends to negate the guilt or mitigate the punishment of the accused…. We clarify that the materiality standard relates not to a specific proceeding in the criminal case, which could be a hearing on a bond or a hearing on the admissibility of certain evidence unrelated to the withheld evidence, but rather to the broader criminal proceeding itself. Material evidence, in this sense, is any evidence tending to be outcome determinative at trial. However, materiality itself is not time-sensitive, and does not come and go depending upon the nature of the next hearing. We do not accept the argument that the evidence need only be disclosed in advance of a proceeding at which that evidence would be specifically determinative. Rather, we conclude that if evidence is material to the outcome of the trial, then the prosecutor must disclose that evidence in advance of the next critical stage of the proceeding--whether the evidence would particularly affect that hearing or not.” Court concluded that while prosecutor not timely disclose evidence subject to disclosure under 3.8(b), ethical rule was not clear, as it had not previously been interpreted by Court, and prosecutor’s actions could not be held to be intentional. Therefore no violation of 3.8(d).

People v. Mucklow, 35 P.3d 527, 537-538 (Colo. 2000). Prosecutor failed to disclose fact that complaining witnesses had recanted/changed stories to defense, in two separate cases, prior to preliminary hearing; in one case, prosecutor acted on advice of elected prosecutor. Court, referring to ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, noted that prosecutor’s obligations to see that accused is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon basis of sufficient evidence, including consideration of exculpatory evidence known to prosecution, goes beyond corollary duty imposed upon prosecutors by constitutional law. “The Rules of Professional Conduct, unlike the rule of law enunciated in Brady, are not premised upon minimal constitutional conformity. Rather, the Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to set forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys licensed to practice law. In most instances, compliance with the Rules' provisions is tested against the conduct of the attorney, not the effect of that conduct upon others. Because Colo. RPC 3.8(d) focuses only upon the attorney's conduct, unlike the requirements of Brady and the cases which apply its constitutional mandate, the effect of the questioned conduct upon the underlying criminal proceeding is not relevant for purposes of determining whether a violation of the rule transpired.” Noting that what constitutes timely disclosure for purposes of Rule 3.8(d) depends on facts and circumstances of each case, Court held prosecutor’s decision to not turn over exculpatory information in both cases prior to preliminary hearings because she believed information would not change outcome of proceedings is not valid reason to circumvent Rule 3.8(d). Interesting dissenting opinion (taking position that insufficient evidence of violation of Rule 3.8).

Tyson v. Florida Bar, 826 So.2d 265, 268 (Fla. 2002). Incarcerated defendant filed complaint against prosecuting attorney for failure to disclose evidence and use of perjured testimony; Bar counsel investigated and found no basis for complaint. Defendant then petitioned Court to issue writ of mandamus requiring Bar proceed with disciplinary proceeding. In rejecting petition, Court reiterated that “purpose of an attorney disciplinary proceeding is the protection of the public, not the vindication of private rights: ‘Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are instituted in the public interest and to preserve the purity of the courts. No private rights except those of the accused attorney are involved.’ Accordingly, petitioner had no clear legal right to have the Bar proceed with disciplinary charges against the assistant state attorney and therefore is not entitled to the mandamus relief he seeks.”

Idaho State Bar v. Gantenbein, 133 Idaho 316, 986 P.2d 339 (1999). Attorney found to have violated Rule 3.4 and 4.1 as result of redacting information from medical report during discovery in personal injury action. Attorney suspended for 24 months.

Matter of Price, 238 Kan. 426, 709 P.2d 986 (1985). County Attorney suspended for repeated failure to abide by discovery orders issued by court and repeated misrepresentations to judge and defense counsel in one case and wearing of World War II German officer's uniform with Nazi insignia while in court prosecuting another case.

In Re Jordan, Opinion No. 2004-B-2397 (La. S. Ct. June 29, 2005). Eyewitness to murder gave three statements to police – on night of murder, “visibly shaken” witness said not get good look and probably could not identify perpetrators; three days after murder, witness described clothing, height and hair of the shooter after saying not have contacts in or glasses on and not sure if imagining some of shooter’s appearance; and three weeks after the murder, witness identified someone from photographic lineup. During trial preparation, prosecutor interviewed eyewitness, who told him she was nearsighted and only needed glasses or contacts for nighttime driving and not to see at close distances. Prosecutor decided not need to tell defense either that eyewitness not wearing glasses or contacts on night of crime or about second statement given to police three days after murder because not exculpatory. Supreme Court found prosecutor violated Rule 3.8(d) by failing to disclose second statement to defense. Prosecutor suspended from practice of law for three months, but suspension was deferred.

Feld's Case, 149 N.H. 19, 28, 815 A.2d 383 (2002). Attorney suspended for assisting in, condoning and making inaccurate and incomplete sworn responses that he knew were inaccurate in violation of Rule 3.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Court also found that attorney invoked attorney-client privilege during deposition when knew invocation of privilege not legitimate, but rather bad faith effort to impede opponent's discovery. “Such conduct violates not only Rule 3.4(d), but also Rule 3.4(c), which requires a lawyer to obey the rules of a tribunal, including Superior Court Rule 35(b)(1), which requires compliance with legitimate discovery requests.” Court also reiterated that, in disciplinary cases involving dishonesty, lawyer must admit to professional misconduct to truly demonstrate remorse for purposes of mitigation.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 99 Ohio St. 3d 222, 790 N.E.2d 1195 (2003). Prosecutor disciplined for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in child molestation case, i.e., DNA results which favored defendant and victim’s change in story. Prosecutor negotiated plea with defendant without disclosing this information.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 3d 369, 613 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1993) Exhibits introduced at first trial of defendant not found before case was retried; during break in retrial, prosecutor found exhibits in their exhibit bag and gave them to deputy clerk of court, telling him what case they belonged to and that case being tried. When trial resumed, prosecutor not bring discovery or whereabouts of exhibits to attention of either judge or defense attorney; just before argument, bailiff obtained exhibits from clerk’s office and judge allowed late introduction. In disciplinary proceeding, prosecutor admitted not tell defense attorney due to acrimonious relationship. Finding the prosecutor’s actions violated DR 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that which he or she is required by law to reveal), 7-103(B) (failing to timely disclose the existence of evidence that tends to negate guilt, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment), and 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), the Court characterized role of prosecutor as that of "standard bearer" of "truth and fairness" and found that Jone's "deceptive conduct * * * flies in the face of his public mandate to protect the rights of all citizens."

In re DeRobbio, 604 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1992). Prosecutor, when providing defense counsel with short rap sheet on witness, warned that record might not be complete and said that witness was career criminal. Court found prosecutor not violate rules because turned over what was in his possession and notified defense of probability of further record.

In Matter of Donald V. Myers, 355 S.C. 1, 584 S.E.2d 357, 362 (2004). Elected prosecutor found to have failed to properly supervise deputy prosecutor to ensure that defense counsel was informed that police officers and deputy prosecutor eavesdropped on and recorded privileged conversation between criminal defendant and his counsel (elected prosecutor told deputy prosecutor to disclose information to defense, but not follow up to see if deputy prosecutor did as told). Court, issuing private reprimand for this failure to supervise, noted “We hold a [prosecutor] in this state to the highest ethical standards, for his actions determine a criminal's fate. We understand that the pressures of the position, as well as imperfect communication procedures with the county sheriff's office, may impede the [prosecutor] in exercising his supervisory authority, but no excuse can justify actions which prejudice the defendant in a capital case. A [prosecutor] must implement and manage a system that enables him to appropriately supervise his deputies so that when he discovers that they may be violating a Rule of Professional Conduct, he can immediately ameliorate any prejudicial effect that the violation may have on the defense.” Court also issued letter of censure for improper jury contact in another capital case; in that case, after it was noticed that potential juror had two addresses but only one telephone number, investigator on prosecutor’s jury selection team, in prosecutor’s presence, telephoned number and asked if potential juror lived there. That contact was found to have violated Rule 3.5(b) of state’s Rules of Professional Conduct.

In Matter of Humphries, 354 S.C. 567, 582 S.E.2d 728 (2003). Prosecutor walked in as police surreptitiously listening to confidential conversation between defense counsel and defendant in capital case and told police to stop; prosecutor left without verifying police did stop listening. Later heard tape had been made of the conversation and received discovery request from defense counsel. Prosecutor’s failure to respond to defense counsel's discovery requests by reporting rumored existence of videotape recording of meeting of defendant and his former attorney, determine whether rumored existence of tape was correct, and promptly provide defense counsel with copy of tape once existence verified found to have violated Rule 3.4(c)(lawyer shall not knowingly disobey obligation under rules of tribunal except for open refusal based on assertion that no valid obligation exists), Rule 3.4(d)(lawyer shall not, in pretrial procedure, fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with legally proper discovery request by opposing party), Rule 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to administration of justice). One-year suspension ordered.

In re Grant, 343 S.C. 528, 541 S.E.2d 540 (2001). Supreme Court held that prosecutor’s violation of discovery requirements set out in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) – he failed to fully disclose exculpatory material and impeachment evidence regarding statements given by prosecution's key witness in murder case – violated Rules 3.4(d)(failing to make diligent effort to comply with discovery request of opposing party); Rule 3.8(d)(failing to make timely disclosure to defense of known evidence or information that tends to negate guilt of accused or mitigate offense); Rule 8.4(a)(violating Rules of Professional Conduct); and Rule 8.4(e)(engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to administration of justice).

Trammell v. Disciplinary Bd. of Ala. St. Bar, 431 So. 2d 1168 (Ala. 1983). Attorney disbarred for accepting money to bribe member of Board of Pardons and Paroles.

In matter of Brown, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 309 (1993). Attorney, who had been disbarred for conspiring with clerk of court to lower DUI charges to reckless driving upon guilty pleas, met burden of proof required to show that he was rehabilitated and it was recommended that he be reinstated to Bar of State of California. Opinion contains review of reinstatement procedure and burden of proof.

Matter of Palmer, 259 Ga. 501, 384 S.E.2d 671 (1989). Attorney disbarred for taking fee to represent client in court in which not admitted to practice, neglecting matter entrusted to him, and failing to cooperate or respond in investigation of grievance complaint Attorney disbarred.

In re Crisel, 101 Ill. 2d 332, 461 N.E.2d 994 (1984). Attorney suspended for fabricating report that attorney was victim of crime as it showed dishonesty and misrepresentation.

In re Howard, 69 Ill. 2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1978). Attorney disciplined for, inter alia, paying $50 to two different police officers in attempt to influence their testimony, telling office he had things “set” with judge and telling officer that would be spending money with prosecutor’ s office.

In re Kien, 69 Ill. 2d 355, 372 N.E.2d 376 (1977). Attorney disciplined for offering bribe to police officer.

Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 2004). Attorney disciplined for working part time as public defender while working full time state job and using sick leave from that job to make court appearances for public defender. Also submitted false expense reports to public defender.

Matter of Sutton, 265 Kan. 251, 959 P.2d 904 (1998). Assistant county attorney issued public censure for (1) committing traffic violations and getting into a verbal and physical confrontation with highway worker which led to tort suit against him, and (2) failure to reimburse county for seminar expenses it had paid when he requested and received funds for same expenses from National Association of Prosecutor Coordinators.

State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Cook, 194 Neb. 364, 232 N.W.2d 120, 129 (1975). Attorney given three year suspension for committing perjury while testifying as witness for United States in prosecution for obstruction of justice and conspiracy. Court provided definition of “lie:” “To lie is to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. Even though a statement as to the truth of a fact is mistaken, the statement is not a lie if the sayer himself honestly believes it to be true.”

O'Meara's Case, 150 N.H. 157, 834 A.2d 235 (2003). Attorney disciplined for false statements made while appearing pro se in divorce and custody matters.

In re Case of Budnitz, 139 N.H. 489, 658 A.2d 1197 (1995). Attorney disbarred for making false statements in disciplinary proceeding.

In re Ross, 716 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 2000). Assistant district attorney and her attorney husband were both censured when, at husband’s request, she tried to use position to undermine traffic summons issued to husband.

Matter of Pollard, 570 N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1991). Former prosecutor suspended for, inter alia, submission of fraudulent expense vouchers.

Matter of Jelliff, 271 N.W.2d 588 (N.D. 1978). State Attorney received 60 day suspension for practicing without license and commingling funds and converting funds to own use.

In re Crum, 55 N.D. 876, 215 N.W. 682 (1927). Noting that it is not use to which money was put, but purpose for which offered that determines if is bribery, Court found prosecutor accepted bribe. Six month suspension imposed.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Carpenter, 68 Ohio St. 3d 99, 623 N.E.2d 1188 (1993). Village Solicitor permanently disbarred for, inter alia, conversion of funds and failing to pay mortgage due on behalf of village.

Disciplinary Counsel v. DiCarlantonio, 68 Ohio St. 3d 479, 628 N.E.2d 1355 (1994). City Attorney disbarred for conspiring to change city’s fire ordinances in return for solicited bribe.

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Scanland, 475 P.2d 373 (Okla. 1970). Former prosecutor disbarred for attempting to bribe police investigator for purposes of destroying arrest record. In reaching decision, Court reiterated that “a District Attorney, or his assistant, is a minister of justice to a degree second only to judges. Accordingly, our views in this case are similar to those expressed by the Court in Re Stolen, supra, and, in which, it was said: 'We consider that upon two grounds the judgment of this court must be as hereinafter pronounced: First, the offense of respondent betrays a lack of moral stamina, and therefore a lack of moral character, which renders the respondent an unfit person to hold the office of attorney at law; and, second, the offense is of so grave a character as to call for serious treatment, not only as a matter of discipline to the respondent, but for its restraining influence upon others.'”

In re Houchin, 290 Or. 433, 622 P.2d 723 (1981). Deputy District Attorney disciplined for enrolling in college course in which he was instructor solely for purpose of maintaining veteran’s benefits.

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 94 P.3d 939 (2004). Defense attorney disbarred for, inter alia, requesting fees and costs from relatives of clients in court-appointed cases.

Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blask, 216 Wis. 2d 129, 573 N.W.2d 835 (1998). Former District Attorney publicly reprimanded for, during time serving as District Attorney, engaging in two physical confrontations, one with elderly man leaving probate court and other with referee at high school basketball game, after which he behaved dishonestly when dealing with police.

Matter of Horwitz, 180 Ariz. 20, 881 P.2d 352 (1994). Attorney’s substantial usage of illegal drugs and reckless conduct while operating vehicle resulting in two deaths warranted disbarment.

In re Parker, 149 Ill. 2d 222, 595 N.E.2d 549 (1992). Attorney reinstated to bar after nine year disbarred upon conviction of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Discusses process for reinstatement to Bar.

Matter of Wolfson, 82 A.D.2d 587, 442 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1981). Former Assistant District Attorney censured for misdemeanor conviction of criminal sale of marijuana (had previously resigned from his position).

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Wright, 792 P.2d 1171 (Okla. 1990). Attorney suspended from practice of law for two years and one day for misconduct, including conviction for distributing cocaine to friends; some of acts of misconduct occurred while attorney was prosecutor.

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Thompson, 781 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1989). District Attorney received nine month suspension after being convicted of possession marijuana (had resigned as elected district attorney after formal criminal charges had been instituted).

Matter of Discipline of Olson, 537 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1995). Court suspended attorney for three years where attorney, while state's attorney, used marijuana and did not seek drug rehabilitation.

Matter of Discipline of Johnson, 500 N.W.2d 215 (S.D. 1993). Deputy State’s Attorney suspended for two years for use of marijuana and cocaine. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Henderson says, “As a people, we cannot tolerate or condone drug activity by prosecutors. The maintenance of a healthy, free society forbids it. Respect for the courts in our land demands it. And a respect for the legal profession cannot survive with its existence.”

Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. White, 189 W. Va. 135, 428 S.E.2d 556, 559-560 (1993). Prosecutor received two year suspension for possession of cocaine, marijuana, and percocet. Court reiterated that prosecutors facing discipline are held to higher standard. "We have taken pains to stress that a lawyer who holds public office is held to a higher ethical standard simply because of his position of public trust. The argument was advanced in Committee on Legal Ethics v. Roark, supra, that an attorney who was a public official should not be held to any elevated standard. In rejecting this argument, we said: ‘In Graf [v. Frame, 177 W.Va. 282, 352 S.E.2d 31 (1986) ], we made this observation: '[A]n attorney who is a public official is held to a high standard of conduct because of his or her (1) professional and (2) public trustee responsibilities.' We went on in Graf to quote from Sanders v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 466 So.2d 891, 893 (Miss.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 133, 88 L.Ed.2d 109 (1985): ' ‘Lawyer insensitivity to ethical impropriety [or perceived ethical impropriety] is one of the primary sources of this lack of public confidence in the Bar. The problem is exacerbated when ethical violations are committed by an attorney holding an important public office.’’ And in Syllabus Point 3 of Roark, we stated: "Ethical violations by a lawyer holding a public office are viewed as more egregious because of the betrayal of the public trust attached to the office." (citations omitted.)

In re Conduct of Gustafson, 327 Or. 636, 968 P.2d 367 (1998). Deputy District Attorney disciplined for, inter alia, threatening defense attorney with criminal or ethical prosecution in order to obtain favorable testimony.

In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002). Application of rule of professional conduct regarding special responsibilities of prosecutor in criminal trial requires court to impose materiality standard; when prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence before any critical stage of proceeding, it must be disclosed before proceeding takes place; rule of professional conduct governing duty of prosecutor to timely disclose exculpatory evidence includes mens rea of intent; and, under facts of this case, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to counsel for accused until after preliminary hearing did not violate rules of professional conduct.

People v. Mucklow, 35 P.3d 527 (Colo. 2000). Prosecutor violated duty to disclose when he failed to inform defense, before preliminary hearing in sexual abuse case, that child victim had recanted portions of her earlier statements and advanced new and different version of prior events.

The Florida Bar v. Cox, 794 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 2001). Prosecutor suspended for concealing testifying informant’s true name from defense counsel, judge and jury. Prosecutor knew informant’s correct name but, listed her on complaint by name she had used during Internet child pornography investigation. Witness had admissible prior convictions. Presumptive penalty was disbarment.

In re Petition for Review of Hearing Committee of Professional, 140 Idaho 800, 102 P.3d 1119 (2004). Attorney disciplined for obtaining grand jury transcript without order of court in case he was prosecuting and giving copy of that transcript to third party engaged in civil litigation against same defendant.

In re Jordan, 278 Kan, 254, 91 P.3d 1168 (2004). Prosecutor’s false statement to court regarding her participation in securing warrant for arrest of defense witness resulted in public censure. Same prosecutor failed to disclose evidence of victim’s cocaine usage while arguing that defendant secretly caused her to ingest cocaine at time of commission of crime.

The Florida Bar v. Von Zamft, 814 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2002). Prosecutor disciplined for ex parte communication with judge, personal friend with whom he was having lunch, regarding motion in capital murder case after being told by judge not to discuss case.

In re Conduct of Burrows, 291 Or. 135, 629 P.2d 820 (1981). Prosecutor disciplined for, inter alia, improper ex parte communication with judge about defendant working with police and passing polygraph.

In re Barnes, 281 Or. 375, 574 P.2d 657 (1978). Deputy District Attorney reprimanded for obtaining search warrant for blood sample, when he knew hearing had been scheduled to determine if warrant should issue.

Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 85 Conn. App. 425, 857 A.2d 424 (2004). Attorney disciplined for making reckless comments in letter to judge about probate judge’s purported acceptance of money to perform duties in estate when he had no evidence of same.

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 561 Pa. 167, 749 A.2d 441, 449 (2000). Attorney suspended for five years for reckless allegation, made in motion to recuse, that two appellate judges had been “fixed” against Surrick’s case. In reaching its decision concernng the appropriate sanction against Surrick, the Court noted, “The purpose of our system of professional responsibility and disciplinary enforcement is to protect the public, the profession and the courts from unfit attorneys. An accusation of judicial impropriety is not a matter to be taken frivolously. An attorney bringing such an accusation has an obligation to obtain some minimal factual support before leveling charges that carry explosive repercussions. When an attorney makes an accusation of judicial impropriety without first undertaking a reasonable investigation of the truth of that accusation, he injures the public, which depends upon the unbiased integrity of the judiciary, the profession itself, whose coin of the realm is their ability to rely upon the honesty of each other in their daily endeavors, and the courts, who must retain the respect of the public and the profession in order to function as the arbiter of justice. ‘Truth is the cornerstone of the judicial system; a license to practice law requires allegiance and fidelity to truth.’ When a lawyer holds the truth to be of so little value that it can be recklessly disregarded when his temper and personal paranoia dictate, that lawyer should not be permitted to represent the public before the courts of this Commonwealth.” (Citations omitted.)

In Matter of Donald V. Myers, 355 S.C. 1, 584 S.E.2d 357 (2004). Solicitor disciplined for failure to properly supervise deputy solicitor to ensure that defense counsel be informed that police officers and deputy solicitor eavesdropped on privileged conversation between criminal defendant and his counsel, and for solicitor's conduct in permitting member of his jury selection team to contact member of jury venire.

In Matter of Barton, 347 S.C. 278, 554 S.E.2d 680 (2001). City Solicitor accepted discipline of public reprimand by consent for sending questionnaires to prospective jurors with cover letter asking jurors to return questionnaires to city solicitor's office.

Matter of Delgado, 279 S.C. 293, 306 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1983). Attorney talking to two jurors who had finished serving on jury of case that had concluded, about how attorney might improve trial skills when approached by jury who had served on the concluded case and was then serving on jury in case attorney presently trying. Attorney allowed him to join in discussion, but advised that could not talk about trial currently underway. Conversation continued for another five to twenty minutes and included attorney's view of lawyer's role in defending person he knows to be guilty, jury dynamics and attorney’s life/practice. Court, concluding attorney violated disciplinary rule prohibiting contact with sitting member of jury, explained purpose of rule. “The rule is intended not only to prevent an intentional attempt to bias or prejudice a juror but to prevent the appearance of impropriety and the possibility of one attorney gaining advantage in a trial by befriending or becoming intimate with a juror through ‘innocent’ conversation.” Public reprimand issued for this and other violations.

In Matter of Respondent A, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 255 (1990). Attorney disciplinary proceedings dismissed where court found attorney communicated with jurors post-trial, but had no intent to harass, embarrass or influence further jury service.

Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 150, 980 S.W.2d 425 (1998). Attorney disciplined for post-trial communication that was insulting to jury and intended to influence their future jury service.

Matter of Carlson, 268 Ga. 335, 489 S.E.2d 834 (1997). Attorney, convicted of flagrant failure to pay child support, was held to have committed crime of moral turpitude and thus violated ethical rules. License suspended for twelve months or until child support arrearage was fulfilled, whichever period was longer.

In re Discipline of Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 815 N.E.2d 1072 (2004). Attorney did not commit ethical violation by delivering copy of state trooper’s deposition testimony to trooper’s supervisor during personal meeting in which attorney expressed his opinion that trooper was incompetent to investigate fires and explosions.

Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ross, 97 Ohio St. 3d 224, 778 N.E.2d 39 (2002). Failure to cooperate in investigation of disciplinary complaint warranted public censure.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Booher, 75 Ohio St. 3d 509, 664 N.E.2d 522 (1996). Public defender disciplined for engaging in sexual activity with client in jail visitation room.

In Matter of McFarland, 360 S.C. 101, 600 S.E.2d 537 (2004). Attorney received public reprimand for failure to respond to discovery in timely manner and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigation.

In Matter of Anonymous Member of SC Bar, 346 S.C. 177, 552 S.E.2d 10 (2001). In disciplining civil attorney for failure to supervise junior associates, Court looked to Rule 5.1 and held that (1) supervisory attorney can be disciplined for failing to take reasonable measures in supervising attorneys even not know of supervised attorney's inappropriate behavior, (2) law firm partner must take action after discovering another attorney in firm has engaged in ethical misconduct, and (3) attorney need not be day-to-day supervisor of attorney committing misconduct to create liability.

In Matter of Smith v. Bd. of Commissioners of Ala St Bar, 284 Ala. 420, 225 So. 2d 829 (1969). Attorney disciplined for conspiring to prevent true and accurate records to be kept relating to divorce cases filed in court.

In Disciplinary Matter Involving Walton, 676 P.2d 1078 (Alaska 1984). Attorney given public censure for creating and admitting document that purported to be first deed of trust when it actually was subordinate deed.

Matter of Stump, 621 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1980), overruled on other ground, Matter of Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1986). Attorney suspended for five years for manufacturing document for use in his own behalf in civil case and falsely testifying that it was authentic.

In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. 232, 92 P.3d 862 (2004). Prosecutor suspended for improper cross-examination of defendant’s expert in mental defense case (despite fact prosecutor aware that all mental health experts, including prosecution’s, had concluded criminal defendant mentally ill, prosecutor cross-examined defense experts intimating that experts made up mental illness diagnosis). Prosecutor also committed violation in closing argument by attempting to cause jury to convict based on fear of future crimes by defendant. Lengthy experience as prosecutor found to be aggravating factor because prosecutor knew actions were improper and his violations were intentional.

Matter of Hansen, 179 Ariz. 229, 877 P.2d 802 (1994). Assistant city prosecutor censured for telling court and defense counsel that complaining witness did not appear when in fact witness had appeared and prosecutor had told her she was free to leave. When court did not recess until following day as anticipated, prosecutor told court witness had not appeared to cover her mistake.

In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 (Colo. 2002). Defense counsel disciplined for making knowingly false representations to prosecutor regarding client’s criminal history to induce plea agreement and to court for sentencing purposes.

In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002). Deputy District Attorney disciplined for misrepresenting himself as public defender in attempt to convince wanted murder suspect to turn himself in. Court held that ‘[n]o imminent public harm exception existed to the ethical principle that a lawyer may not engage in deceptive conduct, and thus deputy district attorney who deceived a murder suspect in order to encourage his surrender was not justified in violating the professional conduct rule prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”

People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035 (Colo. 1991). Prosecutor disciplined for filing sham complaint and preparing sham report against undercover police officer in order to help protect identity of police officer.

In re Sims 861 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2004). Attorney for driver’s license administrative board disbarred for fixing tickets for family members and friends; conviction for misdemeanor arising out of said conduct involved moral turpitude.

The Florida Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2001). Prosecutor suspended for concealing testifying informant’s true name from defense counsel, judge and jury. Prosecutor knew informant’s correct name but, listed her on complaint by name she had used during Internet child pornography investigation; witness had admissible prior convictions.

Matter of Mitchell, 244 Ga. 766, 262 S.E.2d 89 (1979). Attorney who not only encouraged witnesses to testify falsely in paternity hearing, but also called them so could testify falsely was disbarred.

Idaho State Bar v. Malmin, 139 Idaho 304, 78 P.3d 371 (2003). Attorney disciplined for violation of 8.4(c) (professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) due to telling client that papers had been filed when they had not.

Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 44 P.3d 1141 (2002). Prosecuting attorney discipline for (1) failing to take timely and reasonable remedial measures when prosecuting witness gave false testimony in criminal matter in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(4); and (2) writing offensive words next to name of inmate he was prosecuting on inmate board at jail in violation of Rule .4.4(a).

Matter of Eliasen, 128 Idaho 393, 913 P.2d 1163 (1996). Eliasen obtained judgment against patient for dentist; when patient told lawyer unable to satisfy judgment, lawyer wrote letter telling patient that if he did not pay within set period of time, he would report nonpayment to DMV and patient’s driver’s license would be suspended. Patient contacted lawyer who told him Eliasen was incorrect and patient wrote letter to Eliasen telling him what lawyer told him; Eliasen wrote another letter to patient in which he repeated statement that patient’s driver’s license would be suspended if he did not pay judgment. Only after second letter did Eliasen contact DMV and find out that his understanding of law was incorrect; he did not contact patient to correct misstatement. Court held that Eliasen knowingly made false statement of law in second letter sent to patient in violation of rules, and public censure was appropriate.

In re Crisel, 101 Ill. 2d 332, 461 N.E.2d 994, 999 (1984). Crisel, elected prosecutor, who failed at attempt to kill self with gun, filed false police report to cover up bullet holes inside car. Court found that fabrication of report that attorney was victim of crime showed dishonesty and misrepresentation. “Respondent's intentional misrepresentations were closely related to, and in complete contravention of, his responsibility as a State's Attorney, to enforce the law. These acts were evidence of his lack of professional and personal honesty, threatening the integrity of the legal profession and the administration of ju